Introduction
Amid recurrent media depictions of 'sinking islands' and scenarios of mass relocation of island communities from low-lying atolls, three consistent messages from Pacific peoples can be heard. The first is that for most, their wish and intention is to continue to live in their home countries despite the mounting effects of climate change with dignity, in safety and prosperity.
1 Secondly, Pacific communities have no wish to relieve the international community of its obligations and commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by offering large-scale migration from low-lying islands as 'the' solution to climate change within the region. Thirdly, migration should, if it is ultimately necessary, be undertaken in a planned, coordinated way, respecting and reflecting the resilience of people who are no strangers to re-establishing themselves in new environments in response to changing environmental conditions. This is what they have done for centuries.
For over 150 years, New Zealand has played a significant role in the South Pacific. Vibrant cultural, political, economic, and sporting interchanges reflect recognition amongst a broad cross-section of New Zealand society that its spiritual as well as geographic home is within the southern waters of the Pacific, rather than cities or fields of Europe. New Zealand hosts significant expatriate populations of Samoan, Tongan, Tuvaluan and others of Pacific origin. The ancestors of its indigenous Maori population traversed the Pacific Ocean to establish their home there.
Given its strong ties with other South Pacific nations, it would be natural to expect New Zealand's support role to flow into proactive planning, and legal and policy provision for responding to the effects of climate change in the Pacific. To an extent, it has. New Zealand is a significant donor to many Pacific countries. It has committed to on-going financial and technical support on climate change adaptation projects in a number of low-lying island states, including a recently announced five-year partnership to improve water security in Tuvalu, Tokelau, Kiribati, the Cook Islands and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. 2 1 For a recent discussion of the tension between the desire of residents of low-lying Pacific islands to remain in their home locations and the potential for migration see, for example Smith, R & McNamara, K, 'Government discourses of climate change migration in Tuvalu and Kiribati', 8 July 2013, editorial on the website of the Asia-Pacific Migration and Environment Network http://apmen.iom.int/en/m/editorials/item/141-government-discourses-of-climate-change-migration-intuvalu-and-kiribati 2 New Zealand Prime Minister John Key news release 4 September 2013 'Clean water initiative for lowlying Pacific islands' http://www.johnkey.co.nz/archives/1715-Clean-water-initiative-for-low-lying- Pacificislands.html In 2009, Waikato University geographer John Campbell estimated that there would be between 665,000 and 1.7M climate-displaced people in the Pacific by 2050.
5 A major 2012 study on existing and predicted future population movement in the Pacific commissioned by New Zealand's Department of Labour reached the conclusion that climate change represented a "threat to the livelihoods, security and well-being of Pacific people…which may force mass migrations", however did not include any quantification of the potential numbers involved. 3 It is noted at the outset that migration to 'developed' South Pacific countries such as New Zealand or Australia is by no means the only, or likely even to be the preferred option, in the event that citizens of low-lying Pacific countries are not able to remain in their home nations as a result of climate change impacts. As noted by Elliott & Fagan, 'Some people have raised the possibility of expanded systems of migration to Australia and New Zealand, but Pacific leaders have suggested it might be more appropriate to call for support from Australia and New Zealand to help people resettle to other Pacific Islands. These islands may provide a more suitable cultural context for displaced rural communities. ' A detailed account of the arguments for and against the relevance and application of these instruments or documents to climate-displaced persons is beyond the scope of this paper. In summary however, none provide unequivocal binding direction on countries such as New Zealand concerning domestic obligations to assist the citizens of other states displaced as a result of climate change. Responding to threats from climate change on Pacific states was a central topic for discussion at the September 2013 meeting of the PIF in the Marshall Islands capital Majuro in September 2013. The widely publicised 'Majuro Declaration' was a key output of that meeting -a document which develops, with greater urgency, themes addressed five years earlier in Niue.
16 Unsurprisingly, provisions of the Majuro Declaration highlight the need for, and commitment to, measures to 'urgently reduce and phase down greenhouse gas pollution in order to avert a climate crisis for present and future generations.' The need for support for adaptive measures is addressed, but the document omits the reference to 'relocation' made in the Niue Declaration:
In addition, we commit to accelerate and intensify our efforts to prepare for and adapt to the intensifying impacts of climate change, and to further develop and implement policies, strategies and legislative frameworks, with support where necessary, to climate-proof our essential physical infrastructure, adapt our key economic sectors and ensure climate-resilient sustainable development for present and future generations.
N ew Z ealand legal and policy framework
Contrary to the (mis)understandings of an intriguing number of international commentators, 17 New Zealand has no specific immigration policies which, explicitly at least, are intended to address hardship and deprivation experienced in South Pacific nations as a result of climate change.
New Zealand does have a number of targeted immigration schemes which include capped quotas allowing defined groups from defined Pacific nations to participate in an annual ballot, and if successful, have the opportunity to then be considered against a number of other criteria (including language, income and work offer requirements). Most notably, they include the Pacific Access Category (PAC), the Samoan Quota and the Recognised Seasonal Employment (RSE) Scheme. Each of these schemes is well known by citizens of most Pacific nations, and the policies appear to be regarded as important practical and symbolic reflections of ties between New Zealand and Pacific nations. It is understood that all of the targeted schemes are fully subscribed. There are no indications however that the government is planning to increase target/quota numbers, whether in response to increased demand by an ever-growing South Pacific population, or in light of existing and predicted future drivers for migration and displacement associated with deteriorating environmental conditions because of climate change.
Refugee status in New Zealand for climate displaced persons
A number of cases have come before the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal (formerly, the Refugee Appeals Authority) involving applicants seeking refugee status relying at least in part on hardship and deprivation in their home countries caused or contributed to by climate change. Consistent on this point with similar cases in Australia 18 , the appeals have, without exception been unsuccessful.
In 2000, a group of appeals was heard by the New Zealand Refugee Appeals Authority (as it was then named) involving applications for refugee status from related appellants from Tuvalu. 19 In similar terms, the Tuvaluan family members advanced grounds for refugee status in New Zealand, citing concern at rising sea levels which would exacerbate existing issues of inundation of the family home, together with poor medical facilities and the scarcity of employment opportunities within their home country. It was also submitted that 'the Tuvalu government failed in its duty of protecting the civil political, social, cultural and economic rights of the appellant for reasons of race (Tuvaluan), as nationals of Tuvalu (citizens) and as a member of a particular social group (defined as having no means to sustain themselves and survive).'
The RAA dismissed the appeals, holding: 20 Clearly, none of the fears articulated by the appellant vis-à-vis his return to Tuvalu, can be said to be for reason of any one of the five Convention grounds in terms of the Refugee Convention, namely race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group and political opinion. This is not a case where the appellant can be said to be differentially at risk of harm amounting to persecution due to any one of these five grounds. All Tuvalu citizens face the same environmental problems and economic difficulties living in Tuvalu.
In 2013, an appeal was brought to the successor of the RAA, the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal by a resident of Kiribati, also seeking asylum in New Zealand in large part due to deprivation resulting from adverse environmental conditions caused by climate change in his home country.
The decision of BL Burson, Member of the IPT, in the 2013 AF (Kiribati) 21 case may well represent the most detailed legal analysis of an application for asylum on behalf of a climate-displaced person anywhere in the international refugee jurisprudence to date.
On behalf of the IPT, Burson accepted in its entirety, the evidence adduced on behalf of the i-Kiribati appellant relating to the physical and geographical vulnerability of Kiribati to existing and future effects of climate change, including rising sea levels, "risks to the land resource based livelihood of the people are from droughts, inundation of land from storm surges, salt water intrusion to water lenses, and excessive rainfall creating runoff into drinking groundwater wells", coastal erosion, deterioration of marine resources including coral reefs and fish stocks. 22 In combination with growing population, general economic conditions, the IPT accepted without demur the significant hardships already being experienced by residents of the low-lying atolls, as well as predicted future difficulties that will arise as the range of effects of climate change make themselves known with increasing intensity in Kiribati. ..the appellant's claim under the Refugee Convention must necessarily fail because the effects of environmental degradation on his standard of living were, by his own admission, faced by the population generally. The sad reality is that the environmental degradation caused by both slow and sudden onset natural disasters is one which is faced by the Kiribati population generally.
A parallel submission that denying the appellant's asylum in New Zealand (thus requiring him to return to Kiribati) would contravene Article 6 of the ICCPR (the 'right to life') was also rejected: 26 … the risk to the appellant and his family still falls well short of the threshold required to establish substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of arbitrary deprivation of life within the scope of Article 6. It remains firmly in the realm of conjecture or surmise.
In dismissing the appeal, the IPT took care to make it clear that the decision should not be regarded as definitively rejecting the potential for refugee or protection status under New Zealand or international law in all instances where displacement has or will occur in circumstances involving the effect of climate change. The decision contains an impressive analysis of climate change-influenced displacement under international refugee and human rights law, and careful qualification of its findings.
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Nevertheless the decision confirms the position already taken in previous New Zealand refugee appeals, international case law and academic commentary, namely that under New Zealand's existing legal regime for refugees and immigrants (itself built upon the existing international law in this area), only in the most exceptional circumstances will persons displaced as a result of climate change be entitled to legal recognition as refugees or protected persons. South Pacific have no clear legal avenues available to them. Existing immigration schemes such as the PAC, Samoan Quota and RSE may provide opportunities for some seeking temporary or permanent residence in New Zealand. However, those schemes require pre-arranged employment with minimum obligations for financial support. They are also tightly controlled in terms of annual quotas.
New Zealand government policy development
There is no obvious sign of any existing or imminent 'wave' of would-be migrants to New Zealand from the South Pacific. However despite the lack of empirical analysis on the likely future migration flows within the South Pacific as a result of climate changerelated effects, it is not especially controversial that by 2050, large numbers of South Pacific residents will have been displaced as a result of a combination of population and environmental factors. It would be naïve, given New Zealand's existing strong ties with its South Pacific neighbours, to expect anything other than a significant increase in the numbers of Pacific residents seeking refuge in the relatively climate-change buffered environment of New Zealand. 28 One might expect that the New Zealand government would be actively considering the implications from a legal, policy and practical perspective of future migration and displacement scenarios within the region. "…New Zealand's existing immigration policy settings are sufficiently flexible that they may be able to form one response to this issue, should it become a reality in future. Pacific migrants can currently enter New Zealand through general immigration policies, such as those for skilled migrants, temporary workers or family sponsorship. There are also immigration policies specifically for Pacific countries, such as the Pacific Access Category (for migrants from Tuvalu, Kiribati and Tonga); the Samoan Quota and Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Scheme.
None of these policies were developed in response to climate change or climate induced migration although they could potentially be helpful in responding to it as part of a broader toolkit of policy options in which adaptation and mitigation options are given priority…"
A January 2013 MFAT briefing paper to the Associate Climate Change Minister expanded on the theme: 32 "New Zealand's policy on the issue of 'environmental refugees' remains under review. Such 'refugees' have no current status under international law…New Zealand has indicated that it will continue to respond to climatic disasters in the Pacific and manage changes as they arise… Media reporting that New Zealand has agreed to take 'environmental refugees' from Tuvalu…is incorrect. There is no such policy. However New Zealand will continue to monitor the situation and provide climate change assistance and disaster relief as it has always done."
Queried on the reference to New Zealand's policy remaining 'under review', in a telephone interview on 28 May 2013, an MFAT official advised: 33 I think that in that context, I wouldn't want to imply that we have a grand process ... it's more like, we are keeping a watch on it… that if things change or we judge that we may need to refer to Ministers for more guidance, or whatever, then we will. To say it is "under review" doesn't mean that it is "under active review". But it is not like the case is closed, and our policy is done and dusted. It is certainly a living thing, and we keep our eye on developments, that if something did come up that we needed to get some guidance or make recommendations to ministers on, then we would certainly do so.
It is apparent that the government agency with responsibility for policy development on New Zealand's response to climate-displacement in the South Pacific -MFAT -has not updated its policy since 2008, has no active working groups looking at the issue, and as recently as May 2013 has explicitly reconfirmed its position not to reassess its policy settings. 34 • Direct calls by Pacific leaders for engagement by New Zealand and Australia in consideration of a framework and process for planned migration-as-adaptation as part of a wider package of measures to address the impact of climate change on low-lying island states within the South Pacific.
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Options and opportunities Over the past 10 years as issues of the potential magnitude and distribution of climatedisplaced people have begun to enter public consciousness through media reports and NGO awareness-raising, there has been an exponential growth in academic analysis and public policy consideration of various legal and policy responses to the issue.
New or modified existing multi-lateral instruments?
A range of possible solutions or responses to the 'protection deficit' at international law for climate-displaced persons has been developed and discussed in the literature, including:
• Amending the 1951 Refugee Convention to specifically cover cross-border displacement as a result of environmental/climate change-caused degradation; • Developing a new, stand-alone multilateral treaty or convention on climate change/environmental displacement;
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• Developing a new protocol to the UNFCCC which specifically addresses climate change displacement.
A detailed assessment of the merits of the multilateral instrument options listed above is beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, the author:
• shares the strong reservations expressed by a number of commentators concerning suggested redrafting or supplementing the 1951 Refugee Convention in order to confer refugee or protect person status on persons displaced for environmental or climate change-related reasons;
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• concurs with the views expressed by McAdam and others regarding the shortmedium term practical and political impediments to negotiation of an effective stand-alone multilateral treaty or convention addressing climate change/environmental displacement, while not ruling out entirely the possibility of such an international instrument being developed in the fullness of time; • sees potential for some sort of multilateral framework for coordinating state and regional arrangements and responses for climate change-related displacement to be included in future UNFCCC instruments or decisions, however doubts that in the short-medium term, a full-blown dedicated protocol is likely to be politically or practically feasible.
Regional solutions?
Coordinated regional arrangements, whether recorded in 'hard law' instruments or 'soft law' declarations or statements offer a number of distinct advantages over fully multilateral negotiated outcomes. In the climate displacement context, this is particularly the case for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is the pragmatic issue of reaching a meaningful agreement which contains sufficient specificity and relevance to usefully guide the development of domestic emigration/immigration, protection and other support processes. As has been rightly noted by a number of commentators, for an issue likely to be as politically contentious and sensitive as immigration and refugee policy, the prospects of achieving consensus on the large number of issues that would need to be addressed in such a document within a workable timeframe can only be regarded as wildly optimistic.
On the other hand, documented agreed regional arrangements (while still likely to be challenging politically for the same reasons as those noted above) would appear to have better prospects of success, especially if negotiated through existing regional fora and if they build upon existing regional arrangements, including institutional as well as legal and political affirmations of shared policy objectives.
In the South Pacific context, the Pacific Islands Forum has the question of regional responses to climate displacement already on its agenda and, no doubt, would be central to the development of a coordinated regional response.
The Swiss and Norwegian-led Nansen Initiative, a "state-led, bottom-up consultative process…intended to build consensus on the development of a protection agenda addressing the needs of people displaced across international borders by natural disasters, including the effects of climate change" held the first of a planned series of five regional consultations in Rarotonga in May 2013. 40 The New Zealand government was represented at the event.
The outcome document from that consultation exercise records agreement amongst participants that:
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• "As a consequence of sea level rise, acidification and more extreme weather patterns, voluntary migration, planned relocation and forced displacement are expected to rise significantly in the next decades and beyond"; • "In the context of natural disasters and climate change these developments require action and resource mobilization to be taken at community, national, regional and international levels;
Regional actions agreed as necessary included • "Continue the regional dialogue on voluntary migration, forced displacement and planned relocation"; and • "Develop appropriate normative frameworks to address the protection needs of displaced or relocated populations, including temporary protection schemes or template agreements, which take into account lessons from past experience and incorporate existing good practices from the Pacific Island countries.
It will be interesting to observe the New Zealand government's response, in particular to the second action point noted above.
Conclusions
For compelling historical, cultural and social reasons, most residents of Pacific nations at risk from the effects of climate change regard remaining where they are, and developing adaptive solutions to issues such as rising sea level and increased exposure to weather events, as their first priority. favourable employment and other opportunities likely to exist -is not only under contemplation, but is also a predictable and rational response as part of a wider set of potential adaptive responses to the effects of climate change in the region.
To date, despite rhetorical support for its Pacific neighbours, the New Zealand government has not actively engaged with legal, policy or practical implications of likely significant future flows of climate change-related migration to its shores. Its current policy, if it can be described as such, is not substantively more than a vague commitment to 'wait and see.' No doubt this is convenient in terms of existing domestic politics. But a failure to plan now will have lasting adverse consequences which, it is suggested, New Zealand, as well as its Pacific neighbours, will come to regret.
